Charging orders over land

Obtaining judgment for a debt is often only the first step along the road to recovering the sum owed, particularly where the debtor does not have the funds available to satisfy the judgment. Moreover, a creditor with the benefit of a judgment remains an unsecured creditor.

A charging order is an indirect method of enforcement which secures the judgment debt rather than satisfies it. Obtaining a charging order over land secures the debt by creating an equitable charge (section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979), so that when the property is sold, the creditor will receive payment from any proceeds of sale which are left, after the repayment of all mortgagees and other charge holders with priority. The process of obtaining

To view the latest version of this document and thousands of others like it, sign-in with LexisNexis or register for a free trial.

TAKE A FREE TRIAL

Latest Property Disputes News

Property Disputes weekly highlights—19 December 2024

This week's edition of Property Disputes weekly highlights includes: a Privy Council decision confirming that leases can be terminated for repudiatory breach and Court of Appeal decisions on the ‘tenant condition’, the Tenant Fees Act 2019, and the status of an unregistered landlord for the purposes of the right to manage. It also includes High Court decisions on claims for property damage by an RTM company and for remedial expenditure to prevent damage caused by continuing nuisance, and Upper Tribunal decisions on the calculation of time periods, the evidence required to impose a civil penalty, and the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal to review the rent under an assured tenancy, and publication of the minutes of the Online Procedure Rule Committee.

Tenant Fees Act 2019—check-out challenge fails (Switaj v McClenaghan)

Property Disputes analysis: the Court of Appeal addressed whether tenancy fees can amount to prohibited payments under the Tenant Fees Act 2019 (TFA 2019) even though they were paid prior to the Act taking effect. The tenant sought to defend proceedings for possession by relying upon a tenancy check-out fee which had been charged with the original tenancy in 2018, arguing that the fee held-over to subsequent replacement tenancies and became a prohibited payment post-TFA 2019. The appeal relied by analogy on the position with deposits where a deposit is notionally treated as being repaid upon replacement tenancies (Superstrike v Rodrigues). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision at first instance to distinguish Superstrike. The case helps clarify the status of tenancy fees paid prior to the Act and whether these can amount to prohibited payments post-2019. Written by Kevin Long, solicitor at Hackney Community Law Centre.

Property Disputes weekly highlights—12 December 2024

This week's edition of Property Disputes weekly highlights includes: a High Court decision granting a final injunction against protestors, Upper Tribunal decisions on whether communal electricity charges that did not account for the use of solar panels were reasonably incurred, the threshold for unreasonable behaviour capable of justifying an order for costs, and calculation of ‘internal floor area’ for the purposes of the right to manage. It also includes the 178th Practice Direction update to the Civil Procedure Rules, the Ministry of Justice’s decision to publish the names of claimants of money judgments on the Register of Judgments, Orders and Fines in England and Wales, and amendments to the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal (Chambers) Order.

How long is twelve months? Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) considers principles for calculation of time periods (Moh v Rimal Properties Ltd; Kelly v Bostall Estates Ltd)

Property Disputes analysis: These appeals (heard together) concerned two applications for rent repayment orders against landlords who had each been managing a house in multiple occupation (HMO) without a licence. Both applications were dismissed as out of time, with this being upheld on appeal. In deciding the appeal, the Upper Tribunal (UT) had to decide how the expression ‘in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made’ was to be construed. In so doing, the judge considered the leading authorities on the construction of time periods, before finding these did not cover the statutory language used. It is a useful reminder to all practitioners that a time period can be shorter than it first appears. The judge also had to decide at what point in time a defence under section 72 of the Housing Act 2004 (HA 2004) is deemed to arise for the purpose of calculating the time period. Written by Joseph Bunting and Timothy Foot, barristers, Maitland Chambers, London.

View Property Disputes by content type :

News