Public sector contract termination

This subtopic is aimed at public sector lawyers dealing with contract matters and considers some of the key issues and circumstances which may arise in relation to contract termination.

A contract may be discharged in a number of ways, including:

  1. performance—where the parties are discharged from further performance once they have completed their obligations under the contract

  2. effluxion of time—where a contract has been put in place for a specific period of time and expires (unless extended)

  3. discharge by agreement—where the parties agree to bring the contract to an end

  4. void contracts—where a contract is void by reason of mistake, misapprehension, or statute

  5. rescission—where one party is entitled to rescind the contract by reason of the other party’s misrepresentation, undue influence or duress

  6. force majeure—where the contract provides for termination in the event of force majeure

  7. frustration—where some unforeseen event prevents the parties from performing the contract

  8. termination—where are party exercises termination rights set out within the contract

  9. breach—where one party is in breach of contract, entitling the other party to terminate the contract

For

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