Special considerations

Copyright © 2025 LexisNexis

Contributions

In most cases, an attempt to undertake a detailed analysis of the parties’ contributions will be specifically excluded by the court. The fact that one party was the breadwinner and one the homemaker should not, by itself, provide any justification for a departure from the sharing principle. Such an approach would be discriminatory, per White v White [2000] 2 FLR 981.

Only in exceptional cases will a contribution over and above that which would normally be found, financial or otherwise, be a factor.

See Practice Note: Contributions of the parties. The following Precedent letter may be sent by practitioners to their clients: Financial applications to the court—client guide.

Special contribution

In a vanishingly small fraction of cases, special contribution may be taken into account. The test has been likened to the test for conduct (per Baroness Hale of Richmond in Miller v Miller, McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 1 FLR 1186), ie where the disparity in the contributions of the parties to the welfare of the family are such that they would be 'inequitable to disregard', they should be

To view the latest version of this document and thousands of others like it, sign-in with LexisNexis or register for a free trial.

Existing user? Sign-in TAKE A FREE TRIAL
Powered by Lexis+®
Latest Family News

Dignity, delay, and declarations on best interests (NHS South East London ICB v JP & the Royal Hospital for Neuro-Disability)

Private Client analysis: The decision that being provided with nutrition and hydration was contrary to JP’s best interests is recorded in a separate judgment (NHS South East London Integrated Care Board v JP & Others. This judgment focused on the delay in bringing the matter to court, which delay ‘compromised [JP]’s dignity’ (para [5]). Incapacitious individuals like JP are uniquely vulnerable and their interests require vigilant protection. Their inherent dignity as human beings requires regular assessment of where their best interests lie. Hospital trusts, charities, and ICBs all have to be proactive in promoting the dignity of such individuals. Disputes between family members must not be permitted to delay applications being made to court; instead, they are a signal to make an application. Family members are consulted to illuminate P’s likely wishes and feelings and values and beliefs, not to ascertain the family’s views on what is best. Sensitivity to strongly held family views should not be permitted to detract from the proper focus of decision-making: P’s best interests. Written by Katherine Hampshire, barrister at Serjeants’ Inn.

The Court of Appeal clarifies approach to the test for appointment of intermediaries (Re M (A Child: Intermediaries)

Family analysis: The Court of Appeal held that in a number of previous decisions, and in guidance issued by the President of the Family Division, an improper gloss had been placed on the wording of the test for the appointment of an intermediary under Part 3A of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) and FPR 2010, PD 3AA. The court found that necessity means necessity and needs no gloss and that the court at first instance had been wrong to refuse a mother in care proceedings an intermediary for a fact-finding hearing and her appeal was therefore allowed. The court allowed the appeal on its merits and looked at the development of the law on the test in some previous recent decisions. Rhiannon Lloyd, barrister and arbitrator at 4PB, examines the issues.

Family weekly highlights—17 April 2025

This edition includes details of the most recent View from the President’s Chambers and updated guidance on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) released by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. Recent judgments, including the Supreme Court's dismissal of an appeal against the discharge of injunctions prohibiting identification of the clinicians involved in treating gravely ill children, consideration of intermediary assistance in care proceedings and the use of a Hadkinson order are also set out.

The Supreme Court holds that anonymity for clinicians in withdrawal of treatment cases involving children should normally be of limited duration (Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Haastrup v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust)

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the hospitals’ appeals in these cases concerning withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for children. There was no basis on which anonymity injunctions in relation to clinicians could be continued indefinitely. If anonymity is sought in such cases beyond a cooling-off period following the child’s death or withdrawal of treatment, the application should be made by the clinicians concerned. Such applications should be supported by specific evidence and the need for any restriction of freedom of expression must be established convincingly. Hannah Markham KC and Madeleine Whelan of 36 Family, Louise Sivey and Eloise Carey of Bates Wells, and Professor Carmen Draghici of the University of London comment on the judgment.

View Family by content type :  
News
Practice notes
Precedents
Q&As

Popular documents

Which financial statement should I use: Form E, Form E1 or Form E2?

Which financial statement should I use: Form E, Form E1 or Form E2?The court form prescribed financial statement is used to set out each party's relevant financial and other circumstances when a financial application has been made. Both parties are required to simultaneously exchange with each

A financial consent order was sent to the court, but the court’s approval was refused as the order was

A financial consent order was sent to the court, but the court’s approval was refused as the order was not considered to be a fair settlement for one party. That party had proceeded with the initial agreement against legal advice. Can the terms of the order be renegotiated with the other party, and

Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculations

Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculationsThis Practice Note provides guidance on the basis and use of Duxbury calculations in relation to the calculation of capitalised spousal or civil partner maintenance/periodical payments, within financial remedy proceedings, including the assumptions made,

Specimen narrative statement in financial remedy applications under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25

Specimen narrative statement in financial remedy applications under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25In the FAMILY COURT SITTING AT [court location]No. [number]Between[applicant name]Applicantand[respondent name]RespondentI, [AB], of [address], state as follows:Introduction1I am the Applicant in
Which financial statement should I use: Form E, Form E1 or Form E2?

Which financial statement should I use: Form E, Form E1 or Form E2?

Which financial statement should I use: Form E, Form E1 or Form E2?The court form prescribed financial statement is used to set out each party's relevant financial and other circumstances when a financial application has been made. Both parties are required to simultaneously exchange with each

A financial consent order was sent to the court, but the court’s approval was refused as the order was

A financial consent order was sent to the court, but the court’s approval was refused as the order was

A financial consent order was sent to the court, but the court’s approval was refused as the order was not considered to be a fair settlement for one party. That party had proceeded with the initial agreement against legal advice. Can the terms of the order be renegotiated with the other party, and

Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculations

Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculations

Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculationsThis Practice Note provides guidance on the basis and use of Duxbury calculations in relation to the calculation of capitalised spousal or civil partner maintenance/periodical payments, within financial remedy proceedings, including the assumptions made,

Specimen narrative statement in financial remedy applications under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25

Specimen narrative statement in financial remedy applications under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25

Specimen narrative statement in financial remedy applications under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 25In the FAMILY COURT SITTING AT [court location]No. [number]Between[applicant name]Applicantand[respondent name]RespondentI, [AB], of [address], state as follows:Introduction1I am the Applicant in